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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation,
Appellant,
-vs.-

HOWARD G. WAHLEN, and
BARBARA M. WAHLEN,

BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE
Case No. 7890

Respondents.

GENERAL STATEMENT
Counsel appreciate the opportunity afforded to file
their Brief Amicus Curiae to give what assistance they
can to the Court in resolving the issues presented by this
appeal.
For years the Banking .Commissioner and the various
corporations authorized to~ do business under the Indus. .
trial Loan law have agreed upon the interpretation of the
provisions of the act with respect to the manner of com. .
puting interest and charges-secure in the knowledge
that such interpretation and construction had been up. .
held by this Court in the case of Peoples Finance and
Thrift Company vs. Varney, 75 Utah 355, 285 Pac. 304.
In the light of the Court's ruling in the Varney case
it is indeed difficult to see how the present case ever arose.
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In reviewing the record one can only state that the trial
court rendered its decision on the basis of the statements
made during the pretrial and perhaps without fully com. .
prehending the nature of the problem presented.
As counsel view the matter the only issue before the
trial court and the sole point involved on this appeal is the
interpretation of a section of our Industrial Loan Act, to . .
wit, 7..-6..-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, (now Title 7,
Chapter 8, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953) which
provides:
''To loan money on the personal undertaking of
the borrower and other persons, or on personal secu. .
rity, or otherwise, and to deduct interest thereon in
advance at the rate of 1 per cent or less of the face
of such loan per month, and in addition, to require
payment in uniform weekly, semi..-monthly or month. .
ly installments, with or without an allowance of in. .
terest on such installments, and to charge a fee of
$2.00 or less on loans of $100.00 or less, and a maxi. .
mum fee of 2 per cent on loans in excess of $100.00
for expense in examining and investigating the char. .
acter and circumstances of the borrower; . . . ''
The facts stripped of unnecessary verbiage are that
the Defendants signed ~note with the Plaintiff for a loan.
The note was for $1378.38, payable in 24 equal monthly
installments. The Plaintiff deducted 26 per cent from the
$1378.38 or $368.38 for interest and fee. The borrower
received $1020.00, with $20.00 of which he purchased
insurance.
The. question: "Does the Utah Statute above quoted
permit this to be· done?". While we are convinced that
this question has already been answered by the Utah Su. .
preme Court in the Varney case, supra, the decision, wi~h . .
out the prior decision in the Varney case, would still have
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to be the same as the statute is clear and unequivocal;
its provisions \vere followed by the lender.
The statute says the lender may, " ... deduct inter...
est ... in advance at the rate of 1 per cent per month
or less of the face of such loan permo nth. . . ." The
Plaintiff deducted 24 per cent from $1378.38 or $330.81.
The statute says " . . . and in addition to require
payment in uniform weekly, semi. .monthly, or monthly in. .
stallments, with or \Vithout an allowance of interest on
such installments. . . . " The Plaintiff's note was payable
in 24 uniform monthly installments.
The statute says " ... and to charge ... a maximum
fee of 2 percent on loans in excess of $100.00 for ex. .
pense.... " The Plaintiff charged $27.57 ( which is 2 per
cent of Qle fase _gf the - 1gaa) . This fee was paid to
Plaintiff by deducting it from the amount Defendants
would otherwise have received. The Defendants received
the balance of the amount of the note.
The Plaintiff followed the clear and unmistakable
language of the statute.
An attempt to confuse the Court has been made
by the back door approach of starting with the amount of
money that the Defendants received, and the claim that
the charges should be added to the net proceeds in order
to determine the amount of the note. We submit the pro. .
vision in the statute to "deduct interest" in advance is
not followed by a process of addition.
It has been argued in this case that given the amount
of money which the borrower desires to take home with
him, it involves the use of higher mathematics to deter. .
mine the amount of the note. That is not so. The pro. .
cess is one every merchant does constantly in pricing his
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goods from his cost price. (An example or two may ~e
in order, i.e. A merchant desires to sell his goods for a
price to yield him a gross profit of 30 per cent of his
sales price. How does he determine the selling price on
an item costing him $137.20? He knows if 30 per cent of
the selling price is profit, then the initial cost to him
equals 70 per cent of the selling price. So he divides
$137.20 by 70 to learn 1 per cent (or $1.96) and multi~
plies by 100 to obtain the selling price which is $196.00.
Similarly, a borrower wants to obtain cash in the amount
of $550.00 from an industrial loan company. How large
a loan must he make on a 15 month basis to yield.
$550.00? The amount of the loan is 100 per cent subject
to a deduction of interest equal to 15 per cent and a
deduction of the fee of 2 per cent, or a total deduction
of 17 per cent. The cash he is to receive will equal· 83
per cent of the amount of the loan. Divide $550.00 by 83
to learn 1 per cent which is $6.6264. Multiplied by 100
this will give $662.64 as the amount of loan necessary
to yield $550.00 net proceeds. From the face of the loan
( 662.64) is deducted interest ( 15%) in the amount of
$99.39 fee (2%) in the amount of $13.25, making a
total deduction of $112.64).
In the case before the court, the borrowers applied
for a loan-not for $1000 but for a loan-in an amount
sufficient to give them net cash proceeds of at least $1000.
(See Tr., Page 20). We submit that the borrowers wanted
to make a loan on which there would be the desired
amount left, after charges had been deducted.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
For convenience in discussing the matter, counsel
have divided this brief into the following points:
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THE MANNER OF COMPUTING AND THE
AMOUNT OF INTEREST WHICH MAY BE CHARG~
ED IS STATUTORY:
THE ST_t\TUTE (SECTION 7~8~3, U.C.A. 1953)
IS SUBJECT TO ONLY ONE INTERPRETATION;
THE AUTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENTS
ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE.
The foregoing points will be discussed in order.
MANNER OF COMPUTING AND AMOUNT
OF INTEREST WHICH MAY BE CHARGED
IS STATUTORY.
It is apparently well understood that the Legislature
may determine within its constitutional limitations what
rate or rates of interest may be charged the public with
respect to loans of money and may further prescribe how
such interest shall be computed. Indeed the Legislature
may prescribe, and in our state legislature has prescribed,
more than one rate of interest and more than one method
of computing it-depending upon the nature of the loan
and the qualification of the lender.
The General Interest Law found in Title 15, Chap~
ter 1, Sections 1 to 9, authorizes an interest charge of 10
per cent per annum, computed on the unpaid balance of
the loan.
Under the Small Loan Act, Title 7, Ch~pter 10, Sec~
tions 1 to 24, interest is computed on the decreasing un. .
paid balance of the loan at a stated rate by the actual
number of days from payment to payment.
A new Installment Sales Finance Act passed by the
1953 Legislature (Senate Bill 138) provides for the addi ..
tion of 1 per cent per month for the time the contract
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is to run on the full amount of the then unpaid balance
of the contract.
The Industrial Loan Act, Title 7, Chapter 8, Sec-tion 1 to 12, where the interest on the face of the loan is
deducted in advance.
In addition there is other legislation on the subject
of rates for credit unions, pawnbrokers, etc.
Cases interpreting the provisions of one of these sta-tutes are not necessarily applicable to the other. The
Varney case, however, decided in 1930, construed our
Industrial Loan Act and has been followed as the law
of Utah since that time.
At this point it might be well to discuss the actual
issues involved in the Varney case and how the problem
was resolved not. only by the Court but also by legisla-tive action. The note involved in the case was dated March
16, 1927. At that time the Industrial Loan Act (Laws of
Utah 1925, Chapter 116) had been in effect less than
two years. Insofar as we have been able to ascertain the
original law was patterned after the California Indus-trial Loan Act. The 1925 statute defined an industrial
loan company and then authorized said lender to loan
money "and to deduct interest thereon in advance at the
rate of twelve ( 12% ) per cent of the face of said loan, and
in addition, to require uniform wekly, semi. .monthly, or
monthly installments." It did not provide, as does the
present act, t h a t the uniform installments could
be required, "with or w i t h o u t an allowance of
interest on such installments." And it was the absence
of that provision which presumably gave rise to the ques-tion raised in. the Varney case to ·the effect that even
though the law authorized interest to be deducted in ad . .
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vance the la\v had to be read in conjunction with the
general interest statute (then Section 3321, Compiled Laws
of Utah 1917) \vhich required interest to be calculated
on a ''per annum or by the year" basis. Thus, argued
counsel for Miss Varney, interest, although calculated in
advance and deducted had to be figured on the basis that
the borrower received the use of $200.00 for one month,
$180.00 for the second month, $160.00 for the third
month and so on in reducing proportions on which such
reducing portions only could the interest be calculated.
Not only did the Supreme Court repudiate this theory
but the Legislature in the interim amended the act (Laws .
of Utah 1927, p. 72) by inserting the provision "with orC----- . J-'~
without an allowance of interest on such installments" v ·
so that both the Legislature and the Court arrived at a .
mutual understanding and interpretation of what the law
intended.
The other argument made by counsel for Miss Varney
was that if the Industrial Loan Act was not construed
in connection with the general interest statute it would be
repugnant _thereto and void. At tl}at time the general in. . ·11 v
terest statute made no exception in its provisions to the
rate therein authorized. Although the Supreme Court re..fused to subscribe to Appellant's theory the Legislature in
1935, in amending the general interest statute specifically iii )J
excepted from the provisions thereof "such exceptions as
are otherwise provided by law."
In addition to the 1927 amendment above referred
to at which time other amendments were made changing
the rate of 12 per cent per annum to 1 per cent per
month and fixing a maximum of two years for any such
loan, the Legislature in 1945 added a proviso that the 2
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per cent charge could not be assessed more often than once
in a six months period. Other than these amendments,
which indicate some careful regulation of the act, the Leg. .
islature has failed in 12 general sessions to modify or
change the statute so as to provide for a different method
of calculating the interest to be charged by an indus. .
trial loan corporation.
If the Legislature did not approve of the interpreta. .
tion given in the Varney case, they could have so stated.
It is not proper to assume that the Legislature does not
know what it is doing. The Legislature has, since the
decision in the Varney case, legislated on consumer finance
a number of times, and has in different acts provided for
various ways of computing interest or charges, indicating
it does understand the various rates and methods of com.putation provided for. It cannot be truthfully said that
the Legislature is unaware of or indifferent to matters of
consumer finance.
This Court interpreted the Small Loan Act of Utah
some years ago in the case of National Service Corpora.tion vs. Gardikis, 110 Utah 275, 172 Pac. 2d 120. Under
the old act, this Court determined that one lender could
have more than one loan with a borrower even though
the total exceded $300.00. The Small Loan Act was
promptly changed t~ provide that no borrower could owe
more than $300.00 to one lender.

THE STATUTE IS SUBJECT TO ONLY
ONE INTERPRETATION
While apparently conceding that the reasoning of
the Supreme Court in the Varney case, supra, is sound
and should not be modified, the Respondents have at.tempted in their brief on file herein to distinguish that
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case from the case here involved. They argue that "the
interesting distinction between the Varney case and the
case at bar is that in the Varney case, the amount orig. .
inally requested by Defendants and the face of the note
are identical, \Yhich in the case at bar the amount request. .
ed by Defendants and the face of the note are not iden . .
tical." We call attention to the finding made by the
trial court (apparently based on stipulations of counsel
and which is not assailed on appea~ by respondents) :
"2. That on or about the 2nd day of July, 1951, ~· ~
the defendants applied to the plaintiff for a loan in
an amount .sufficient to give them net~ 'a&l:J.~q~~eds ~
of at least $1,000.00, which was to be repaid withln.24 months."
The foregoing finding certainly negates any such
argument as Respondents attempt to advance to the ef. .
feet that the two cases are not the same. But even as. .
suming that when a person approaches a loan company
to negotiate a loan he has in mind and mentions a cer. .
tain amount of money which he seeks to obtain from
the company by way of a loan, that is no factor re . .
quiring a different method of computation of the interest.
The Plaintiff company in the instant case made its com. .
putation of interest and fee exactly in the same manner
as did the Peoples Finance and Thrift Company in the
Varney case. The facts in tbe latter ·case were stipulated
to much as they were in the case now before the Court.
In the stipulation it was agreed that Miss Varney ap. .
plied for a loan of $200.00. It is not known whether she
originally asked for the sum of $200.00 or requested a
lesser sum, but whether she asked originally for $200.00
and learned that she could not receive that amount and
contented herself with less or whether she asked for less
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and because it was calculated that the loan would have
to be for $200.00 in order for her to realize the amount
she desired, the same method of computing is involved.
Miss Varney, the borrower, received $178.00. She
was to repay the loan in ten months by ten equal monthly
installments. Ten per cent of $178.00 is $17.80 and the
lender deducted a $2.00 fee. If these figures are added
together as contended by Responds should be done in
this case, the note should have been for $197.80 and
not for $200.00. In doing that, however, the clear Ian. .
guage of the statute is not being followed, because putting
together $17 8.00 and $19.80 or any other sum, is not
deducting but is adding. In the Varney case the charges
were based on the face amount of the note and the charges
in the instant case are also based on the face amount of
the note.
Would it make a difference if the full amount of
the note is handed to the borrower and then have him
pay it back immediately, or paying out only the net pro. .
ceeds in the first instance? The borrower had the option;
he took out the net amount.
If the borrower in the case of Peoples Finance and
Thrift Company vs. Varney wanted to have $200.00 in. .
stead of $178.00 should the rate be different, or the man. .
ner of computing the charges be changed? The answer to
that question is so obvious that it seems absurd to discuss
it. Certainly the statute does not mean that it she want. .
ed $200.00 the charges should be added, but if she want-ed $178.00 they could be deducted. That is what the De. .
fendants are contending in the instant case. The posi. .
tion is not tenable.
In the Varney case the. borrower wanted net cash
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proceeds of $178.00 and therefore had to make a loan
of $200.00. In the instant case the borrower had to make
a loan of $1,378.38 to obtain the net cash proceeds he
desired.
What has been said above with respect to the man. .
ner of computing and deducting the interest applies with
equal force to the manner of deducting the 2 per cent fee
"for expense in examining and investigating the character
and circumstances of the borrower." It frequently hap. .
pens that when a prospective borrower makes applica. .
tion for a loan he does so in order to pay off existing bills,
so that the proceeds of the loan are used insatisfying the
creditors of the borrower. In such case the borrower may
authorize, and the lender may require, that individual
checks be made out to. the respective creditors for the
amounts owing them. In such case the borrower signs
what is known as an authorization to pay the proceeds of
the loan to specific individuals. One of the borrower's
debts created by the making of the loan in the instant
case was the debt of 2 per cent of the face of the loan
for the lender's expense in examining and investigating
the matter. Here again the borrower "authorized" the
deduction of the fee from the proceeds payable to him in
order that this debt be satisfied. If the borrower had suffi. .
cient money to pay the fee from his own pocket, then the' ~,H',
.
t
t-. 't o-;'' •
amount thereof would not have been retained by the tl · ~ lender but would have been paid to him as part of the!
proceeds of the loan. Thus in the Varney case, where.~a·
f~e of $2.00 was charged, if the borrower had paid the
fee from her own funds she would have received $180.00
instead of $178.00-the actual amount paid to her after
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deducting the interest and withholding the amount of the
fee by the lender.
Operators under the Industrial Loan Act originally
thought they understood the language of the statute and
governed themselves accordingly. That interpretation was
challenged and the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the
Act in the case of Peoples Finance and Thrift Company
vs. Varney and reached the same conclusion as to the
meaning of the statute as the lenders had. Business peo~
ple have followed that interpretation and have loaned in
perfectly good faith many millions of dollars. Should it not
now be up to the Legislature to change the law if a change
is to be made?
This Court in Cobb vs. Hartenstein, 4 7 Utah 174,
152 Pac. 424, said:
"Since usury laws are quasi penal, the court will
not hold a contract to be in violation of the usury
laws, unless upon a fair and reasonable construction
of all of its terms, in view of the dealings of the
parties, it is manifest that the intent of the parties
r was to engage in such a transaction as is forbidden
~ by those laws. If two reasonable constructions are
possible, by one of which the contract will be legal,
while by the other it will be usurious and invalid,
the Court will adopt the former.''
Further in the same case we find:
"It is further stated the offense of usury is not
( complete unless there is an unlawful intent to violate
\ the usury statute."
How by any source of reasoning can an attempt or
intent to violate the usury law be found in this case when
the Appellant has not only followed what appears to be
the law, but does exactly what this Court has said is
the law.
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Cobb Ys. Hartenstein, supra, was cited with approval
by this Court by four of the present members of this Court
in Mathis vs. Holland Furnace Company, 166 Pac. 2d
518:
" . -\. contract to be usurious, must be so when )-made .and it is essential that a corrupt-or unlawful ·
intent ·to·· violate the usury law, at least on the part
of the lender be proved to render the contract
usurious."
The penalty for usury being "penal" in nature, this
law must be con trued strictly in favor of the lender.
Edelstein vs. Hub Loan Company, 33 Atlantic 2d.
829, 130 NJL 511:
''Provision of Small Loan Act permitting bor~
rower to recover from lender any sum paid to lender
in connection with loan in event of violation of limita~
tion on charges imposed upon lender is 'penal~-- and
as such to be strictly construed in favor of lender."
And in Maellaro vs. Maddison Finance Company, 31
Atlantic 2d. 485, 130 NJL 140:
"The Small Loan Act is generally 'remedial' in
1
nature, but the provisions enjoining the imposition of :
charges and expenses not specificially authorized are,
highly 'penal' and are therefore to be strictly con~
strued.''
In the case of Tholen vs. Duffy, 7 Kan. Rep. 405,
the Defendant Duffy loaned money to Tholen. A note for
$1';000.000 was signed which provided for the payment
of 12 per cent interest in advance. Duffy held out $120.00
and gave Tholen 880.00. Usury was claimed on the
ground the interest should have been figured on the sum
of $880.00. The Court held the note was not usurious,
stating:
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"Twelve per cent is the highest legal"_;illleHst_
which by the terms of our law, parties may contract
to pay. Exacting this amount in advance, practically
gives to the lender more than 12 per cent on the amount
the borrower actually has the use of during the time
of the loan. It seems difficult upon principal to sus..
tain such a transaction. But in cases where note or
bill is given, it is supported by such an overwhelming
current of decision, and is a matter of such universal
practice, that it may well be considered as engraft..
ed upon the law as a settled rule. It was so settled
f.
qefore the passage of our interest law; and if the Leg..
! }:::- islature had intended to change thi$ rule of construe~ , tion, such intention would have been plainly ex ..
pressed." (Italics added).
Again, in Federal National Bank vs. Wilhelm, 246
Pac. 478 (an Oklahoma case decided in 1926) the borrow..
er claimed that he borrowed $1 ,500.00 from the bank and
executed a note for $1 ,666.50, the $166.50 being charged
as interest; that said $166.50 was usurious because it ex..
ceeded 10 per cent. The statute there provided:
"The interest which would become due at the
end of a term for which a loan is made, not exceed..
ing one year's interest in all, may be deducted from
the loan in advance if the parties thus g.~"
In upholding the transaction, the Court said:
"The note was for $1 ,666.50, and ran for a term
of one year. Ten per cent interest on the note for
one year would amount to $166.65. Deducting this
from the amount of the note, leaves $1,499.85. T'he
Plaintiff admits he received $1,500.00 or 15 cents
more than he was entitled to after interest was de.ducted. Since 15 cents less than 10 per cent of the
principal was deducted as interest, the original note
was therefore not usurious."
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.-\UTHORITIES CITED BY RESPONDENT ARE
NOT .A.PPLIC~A.BLE TO THE INSTANT CASE
We have examined the various authorities cited and
quoted by respondents and find that in every case the .
statute involved \Vas different from that now before the
court for interpretation. Ho\\rever, in several of the cases
the court's decision by dictum upholds the views herein
expressed: In the case of McCall vs. Herring (Georgia)
42 S.E. 468, the court first determined that "A money
lender cannot, in this state, lawfully contract for or re...
serve any greater rate of interest than 8 per cent. per an . .
num." However, even in the absence of a statute author...
izing the deduction of the interest in advance, the Georgia
Supreme Court had previously determined in the case of
Mackenzie vs. Flannery, 90 Ga. 590, 16 S.E. 710, that
"to take 8 per cent interest in advance by way of dis... n.-''
count on short loans, in the usual and ordinary course
of business, is not usurious." A fortiori, if the legislature
of the state of Georgia had enacted a statute authorizing
the deduction of interest in advance, no question would
have been presented in the McCall case, supra.
In the case of Agostini vs. Colonial Trust Company
(Delaware) 36 A(2d) 33, the court was concerned with
a loan made under the Delaware General Interest Statute
which provides:
"Legal Rate; Usury; Penalty:-The lawful rate
of interest for the loan or use of money, in all cases
where no express contract shall have been made
for a less rate, shall be six per cent per annum; and
when a rate of interest for the loan or use of money
exceeding that established by law shall have been
reserved or contracted for, the borrower or debtor
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shall not be required to pay the creditor the excess
over the legal rate . . ." (Italics added).
It will be noted that the above statute is similar to
our general interest law in excepting those situations where
the statute otherwise authorizes a greater rate or different
rate of interest to be charged. In discussing this matter
the court, in the Agostini case, stated that "unless justi. .
fied by some other statute or rule of law, the rate actually
called for by the agreement must be held unlawful." The
lender contended that the agreement was authorized by the
"Small Loan Act." This Act authorized a lender, qualify. .
ing under the law, to loan an amount not exceeding Five
Hundred Dollars and "charge in advance the legal rate of
interest of. six per cent upon the entire amount of the
loan and may make such loan repayable in weekly, month. .
ly or other periodical installments" plus a two per cent
investigation fee. The court went on to hold that deduct. .
ing interest in advance on short term loans was well recog. .
nized and not repugnant in law, even in the absence of
statute. The actual face amount of the loan was $8,000.00,
which was in excess of the amount authorized to. be
loaned under the Act and the Court went on further to
hold that the loan was for a long term and therefore inter. .
est could not be deducted in advance. Under our state
there is both a limi,t~~ion ~f the amount o£ the loan and
the tim~ .w.ithin which it must be repaid. The Appellant
has complied with both of these requirements and no issue
is raised that the loan was either in excess of the author-ized amount or that it was for a longer period than author..
ized by the Act.
In the case of Connor vs. Minier, (California 1930)
288 Pac. 23, the Appellate Court had before it the ques..
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tion of determining whether the loan was usurious under
the general usury law of California. The defendant raised
the issue in its ans\\rer to the cross. . complaint that it was
qualified to do business under the industrial loan law of
California, but the court in reviewing this matter on ap. .
peal held:
" . . . this was an affirmative allegation, which
it was required to prove. If this fact is a defense to
the charge of usury, the plaintiff might also have
proved it under the statutory replication given him
by Section 462 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But
the record discloses neither proof of this fact nor at. .
tempt to prove it."
At that time the statutes of California (from which
it appears that our own Industrial Loan Act was taken)
authorized an industrial loan corporation "To loan money
on personal security, or otherwise, and to deduct interest
there/or in advance at the rate of six per cent per annum,
or less, and, in addition, to receive and to require uniform
weekly or monthly installments on its certificates of in . .
vestment, purchased by the borrower simultaneously with
the said loan transaction, or otherwise, and pledged with_~
the corporation as security for the said loan, with or with . .
out an allowance of interest on such installments. (St!
1917, p. 658; St. 1921, p. 729) "From the italicized por . .
tion of the statute it can readily be observed where our
legislature obtained the phrase "deduct interest therefor
in advance" as well as the phrase "with or without an al. .
lowance of interest on such installments." Under the hold . .
ing of the court in the Connor Case, there appears no
doubt that the court would have upheld the deduction of
interest in advance, (just as our court did in the Varney
Case) if the lender had proved that it qualified under the
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Industrial Loan Act. In the instant case there is no dis. .
pute but that Appellant was qualified under the Indus. .
trial Loan Act, and the lower court so found.
In the later California case cited by respondents
(Taylor vs. Budd, 18 P. 2d 333) the loan was not made
under the Industrial Loan Act, but even if it were claimed
so to be, the rate charged was 12 per cent in advance, in. .
stead of the six per cent authorized by that Act.
/
(It may be noted that the Industrial Loan Act of
California, quoted above, has since been amended so that
a different rate of interest may be charged depending upon
the amount of the loan-ranging from 2lf2 per cent per
month to 10 per cent per annum. Deerings California
Finance Code Ann., Sec. 18655. Under our statutes
the rate of interest varies from 3 per cent per month to 10
per cent per annum. In each case the particular statute
involved indicates whether the interest is paid on the un. .
paid balance or calculated in advance and deducted from
the face of the note) .
Respondents also refer to the case of McKanna vs.
Thorne (Okla. 1922) 209 Pac. 1039, where the Court
held that under the la"r of Oklahoma, 10 per cent inter-est is the maximum amount which the lender was per-mitted to charge. The loan in that case, however, was
for the sum of $6,000.00 for a period of five years. At
that time Oklahoma had a law (Compiled Statutes 1921,
Section 5104) authorizing interest to be deducted in ad-vance "if the parties thus agree" where the loan is for
a term of one year. In construing this statute the Court
in the later case of Federal National Bank vs. Wilhelm,
supra, authorized the interest to be deducted in advance as
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provided by the statute. See also Covington vs. Fisher,
22 Okla. ~07. 97 Pac. 615.
SUMMARY
In conclusion, counsel again desire to express their
appreciation for the opportunity afforded to file the fore,
going Brief. The matter before the Court might well affect ·
the validity of thousands of loans and millions of dollars
advanced by sound and reputable finance institutions who
have qualified to do business under the Industrial Loan
Act and whose operations are subject to supervision and
audit by the Banking Commissioner of Utah, similiar to
banks and trust companies. While we have not attempt..ed to go into the social aspects of the law there is much
that might be stated in justification of an "industrial loan y
rate" of interest as well as a "small loan rate"-separate
and distinct from the general interest rate prescribed under
Title 15, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As a
matter of fact, if the interpretation given the Industrial
Loan Act by the lower court is upheld (which would
require the overruling of the Varney case, supra) there
would be very little, if any, difference in the rate of inter..- /( f.-'t c,
est which might . be charged under the general interest-,
statute and under the Industrial Loan Act. As we view '
the entire picture relating to loan transactions there are
three general gradations of interest which might be charg. .
ed, the industrial loan rate, being the middle, the small
loan rate authorizes 3 per cent per month while the gen . .
eral interest statute (15..-1..-2 U.C.A. 1953) authorizes 1
per cent per month on amounts of $100.00 or less and 10
'f
per cent per annum on amounts in excess of $100.00.
We submit that both the Legislature and the Supreme
Court of this State have heretofore and for a long period

t
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of time recognized the plain, clear, convincing, unequivocal
and specific language of the Industrial Loan Act which
authorizes a person qualified under such Act "to deduct
interest ... in advance at the rate of 1 per cent or less
of the face of such loan per month." The authorities cited
and relied upon by Respondents are not in point, but in
any event, do not indicate that a different construction of
the language of the Act should be made. In fact most
of the authorities referred by Respondents do recognize the
validity of deducting interest in advance where it is author.ized by statute, or accepted by commercial practice on
loans for short periods of time.
We urge the Court to affirm the decision of .the
Varney case by determining that upon the basis of the
facts and the findings of the Court, the loan here in ques.tion was not usurious but that the method of calculating
the interest and the deduction of such interest and fee was
proper under the statute.
Respectfully submitted,
B. R. PARKINSON
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
Counsel, Amicus Curiae.
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